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Transfer Pricing and the Management Control System in the Tax Compliant 
Multinational Enterprise  
Abstract  
To understand the design and use of management control systems (MCSs) in tax compliant multinational 
enterprises (MNE), an in-depth case study was undertaken. The selected MNE chose to use the same 
transfer prices for tax compliance and internal management purposes. We argue that modifications in the 
MCS cannot be understood without an appreciation of the corporate approach towards fiscal transfer 
pricing compliance.Over a sustained period of time, the effect on organising, planning , evaluation and 
reward controls are traced suggesting a more coercive use of the MCS. Three propositions are offered to 
guide future research in this complex area.  
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Introduction  
This study addresses the potential interaction between the design of the management control system 
(MCS)  and tax compliant transfer pricing in the multinational enterprise (MNE). Transfer prices are 
instruments for  integrating and differentiating the actions of parts of the organisation and to evaluate their 
individual performance. This MCS role of transfer pricing has mainly been investigated by the domestic 
management accounting and control literature (Watson & Baumler, 1975; Swieringa & Waterhouse, 1982; 
Eccles, 1983, 1985; Spicer, 1988; Van der Meer-Kooistra, 1994; Colbert & Spicer, 1995; Luft & Libby, 
1997; Ghosh, 2000.). The study of cross-border transfer pricing in MNEs traditionally has a place in other 
streams of the literature: tax law studies discuss the variety in national tax regimes, tax compliance 
requirements, and the optimal transfer pricing method from a fiscal point of view (Kroppen & 
Eigelshoven, 1998; Levey, Brandman & Miesel, 2001; Swenson 2001; Van Mens & Porquet, 2001; 
Douvier, 2005; etc). Tax accounting studies investigate the  degree to which  national tax rate differentials 
lead to transfer pricing manipulation and income shifting (Harris, Kriebel & Raviv, 1982; Jensen, 1986; 
Halpirin & Srinidhi, 1987, 1991; Grubert & Mutti, 1989; Klassen, Lang & Wolfson, 1993; Harris, 1993; 
Jacob, 1996; Swenson, 2001; Gupta & Mills, 2002; etc.). An alternative perspective is provided by the 
contingency literature: it identifies the objectives of the transfer pricing policy and the organisational and 
environmental factors that determine the (international) transfer pricing method. The contingency literature 
mentions transfer pricing tax regulations as one of the environmental factors (Borkowski 1992a, 1992b, 
1996; Emmanuel & Mehafdi, 1994; Cravens & Shearon, 1996; Cravens, 1997;.). However, there are no 
studies to our knowledge which examine transfer pricing in the MNE where tax compliance and MCS 
design is the focus of attention.  
 
Our aim is to refine the contingency literature of MCS in the MNE by investigating whether and how the 
MCS role of transfer pricing is influenced by fiscal regulations. While the extant tax law and accounting 
literature focuses on tax optimisation, we study the issue of tax compliance and its interplay with the 
design and use of the MCS. Tax compliance has recently gained in importance due to the introduction of 
stricter  transfer pricing tax laws by fiscal authorities worldwide. In contrast to a number of recent 
analytical studies calculating  transfer prices that reconcile managerial and tax objectives under certain 
static circumstances (Halpirin & Srinidhi, 1991; Narayanan & Smith, 2000; Hyde, 2002; Baldenius, 
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Melumad & Reichelstein, 2004; Hyde & Choe, 2005), this is an empirical investigation which allows the 
researchers to view the ‘process’ of inter-action over time (Swieringa & Waterhouse, 1982; Spicer, 1988, 
Colbert & Spicer, 1995). In this context the following research question is studied: When a MNE seeks to 
comply with international transfer pricing regulations, what is the impact, if any, on the enterprise’s 
MCS?  
The tax environment 
 
As the tax accounting studies indicate, the differential national tax regimes invite MNEs to engage in 
income shifting. Due to globalization, an increasing volume of trade remains outside of the scope of 
market forces: UNCTAD  (2003) report that 60% of international trade takes place within MNEs. It is 
therefore not surprising that national governments worldwide install transfer pricing regulations. The 
OECD issued Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 1979, which were implemented in the legislation of a number 
of Western countries. By the end of the 1980s, however, transfer pricing became the centre of a political 
debate in the US. US politicians became interested in the potential tax effects of transfer pricing and 
targeted the transfer pricing policies by foreign MNEs (Hamaekers, 2001). The discussion resulted in 
revised and strengthened transfer pricing regulations (§482 of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
regulations and related paragraphs) in 1994. To respond to these developments, the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines were reformulated in 1995. Since that time, an increasing number of countries have , 
and still are, preparing specific transfer pricing rules, mostly implementing the OECD Guidelines. Recent 
studies (e.g. Ernst & Young, 2003) provide overviews of changes in tax authorities’ attitudes since the 
second half of the 1990s in over 44 countries (OECD and non-OECD, developed as well as developing 
countries). Not only have the rules become more explicit and detailed, but, at the same time, national tax 
authorities have increased their administrative resources and severe enforcement measures are in place in 
several jurisdictions. The threat of transfer pricing tax audits has become real for every MNE (Eden 1998). 
Penalties can apply not only to adjustments but also for inadequate or untimely documentation. This was 
recently highlighted when the IRS imposed a claim for additional taxes of US $2.7 billion plus additional 
interest of US $2.5bn on GlaxoSmithKline (The Economist, 2004; Wright, 2004).  
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The arm’s length principle1 provides an international yardstick to judge transfer prices from a tax 
perspective: transfer prices between interrelated parties are acceptable to the tax authorities if the MNE can 
prove that independent parties would have chosen similar prices in similar circumstances (article 9, OECD 
Model Tax Convention,1995). Ideally, transfer prices should be based on market prices, but for various 
reasons a market-based transfer price might not exist: intra-group transactions  of tangibles, intangibles and 
support services are often unique and specific to the MNE and would not be offered  to the market (Eden, 
1998). In practice, therefore, cost-based and negotiated transfer prices are used apart from market-based 
prices (Borkowski 1990, 1992). The 1979 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines prescribed three transfer 
pricing methods2 that, depending on the circumstances and the characteristics of the transfer, provide a 
suitable application of the arm’s length principle: the comparable uncontrolled price method (where a 
market price can be identified and applied), the cost-plus method (which augments the product or service 
cost with a mark-up comparable to that of an unrelated producer with similar activities ) and the resale-
minus method (which works backwards from an arm’s length sales price to an unrelated party and deducts 
a mark-up comparable to that of an unrelated company undertaking similar activities ). Due to difficulties 
with their practical implementation, these three ‘traditional transactional methods’ are now supplemented 
with two profit-based methods in the 1995 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines: the transactional net 
margin method – also known as the comparable profit method (which evaluates operating profit relative to 
an appropriate base like sales or assets, to make sure that the profit earned by the MNE’s unit is 
comparable with that which an uncontrolled company will earn under similar circumstances) and the profit 
split method (which divides the total profit between the buyer and seller to reflect the profits that two 
unrelated parties  earn when undertaking a similar transaction). Despite the dominance of the arm’s length 
principle and the impact of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, MNE  compliance with  transfer 
pricing regulations is not generally seen as an easy task. The arm’s length principle is so fluid that national 
tax authorities interpret and implement it in different ways, reflecting long-established domestic tax 
practices (Eden, Dacin &Wan, 2001; Picciotto, 1992; Ernst & Young, 2003). ‘The consequential 
divergence in approach among tax administrations is a growing concern to MNEs – particularly as 
                                                          
1 Since the arm’s length principle forces MNEs to implement market prices or suitable comparables for 
their internal transactions - thereby ignoring the reasons for the internalisation of the transactions -  the 
principle is challenged by academics (Eden, Dacin & Wan, 2001; Picciotto, 1992) and practitioners (Ernst 
& Young, 2003; Weiner, 2001). 
2 A  ‘fourth method’ category  allowed  other methods to be used if justified (OECD, 1979). 
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countries with no prior formal transfer pricing rules or experience seek to introduce them’ (Ernst & Young,  
2003, 5).  
 
Both the revised US Regulations and OECD Guidelines entail extensive documentation requirements, 
urging MNEs to explicitly justify that their transfer pricing policy does not violate fiscal rules and is based 
on sound business grounds3 (IRS, 1994; OECD, 1995). The more completely the documentation supports 
the MNE’s transfer pricing decision, the more the tax authorities are inclined to accept the policy. A 
functional analysis forms a crucial part of the document to justify the transfer prices in use: it disentangles 
the functions undertaken, assets used and risks taken by the different parties involved in the intra-firm 
transaction. The IRS also requires ‘comparables’ to be provided: the arm’s length character of an MNE’s 
transfer prices needs to be sustained by positioning them amongst the prices and profit margins of 
comparable external transactions between unrelated parties. The pressure to comply with the 
documentation requirements is high. De facto, the burden of proof remains on the MNE, although only a 
limited number of countries like the UK have a self-assessment system in place.  In addition, a firm’s 
transfer pricing document becomes an important instrument when the MNE invokes bi-lateral tax treaty 
agreements between countries .When the tax authorities in one country judge that the MNE has not 
respected the arm’s length principle, they are allowed to adjust the MNE’s taxable basis (article 9, OECD 
Model Tax Convention,1995). Unfortunately, the adjustment of a MNE’s taxable basis in one jurisdiction 
does not always lead to  a corresponding adjustment in the other jurisdiction . To resolve such conflicts and 
prevent  double taxation governments enter into bi-lateral tax treaties.  In the context of the EU, an 
Arbitration Model can also apply but again extensive documentation is required to defend the transfer 
pricing policy (EU Convention 90/436/EEC, 1990).  
 
We report the events experienced by one MNE which chose to adopt tax compliant transfer pricing. One 
immediate, practical effect of this strategy was the use of the same set of  books for MCS and tax purposes. 
                                                          
3 The term ‘sound’ business practices refers to a criterion to judge the acts of an entrepreneur/taxpayer. If 
the decisions of the taxpayer are not based on business considerations, disregarding any personal 
considerations of the persons involved in the decision, they cannot be respected for tax purposes (OECD, 
1995). 
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This appears to be an increasingly common practice  (Baldenius et al., 20044; Ernst & Young, 2003). 
Consultants advise MNEs to work with one set of books as the best proof towards the tax authorities that 
transfer pricing is based on internal instead of  purely tax-driven motives (Ernst & Young, 2003). Tax 
compliant transfer prices which are also used for internal management purposes may therefore become the 
norm in the near future. The consequences of this are investigated over  the period 1993 – 2001 in one 
successful MNE. The data are partly historical, based on archival documents and recollections by 
managers, and partly longitudinal (with one researcher having been present in the company between 1999 
and 2001). Evaluating the inter-relationship with the MCS  is  guided by Chow, Shields & Wu’s (1999) 
framework. Strong support is found of the tax compliant transfer pricing policy influencing elements of the 
MCS which permeate the different levels of the organization. Analytic generalisation suggests tax 
compliance is an additional contingent variable when seeking to understand MCS design in MNEs. Our 
analysis leads to three propositions which provide potentially interesting avenues for future research and 
responds to the call for  theoretical contributions to explain how transfer pricing processes within the MCS 
are actually managed (Spicer, 1988; Colbert & Spicer, 1995).  This contrasts with studies which view tax 
issues  as exogenous environmental factors and do not delve into the deeper internal consequences of 
transfer pricing in MNEs (Shearon & Cravens, 1996; Cravens, 1997). Given  the paucity of evidence on 
the use of transfer pricing for management purposes in the MNE , the interviews and archival data provide 
a unique insight.  
The social relevance of the study is of some significance. Tax authorities wish  to prevent double taxation 
but also to stop tax evasion and manipulation. MNEs seek to comply with regulations but the consequences 
for internal decision-making, performance evaluation and managerial motivation are largely unknown. 
Extending the “arm’s length” principle to management control may result in misallocation of resources  
(Eden, 1998; Hamaekers, 2001).  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The review of the organisational behaviour and MCS 
literatures, leading to the theoretical framework of this study, is presented in the next section .  The 
research method is explained, followed by a description of the research site. The analysis section presents 
in a time-ordered manner the changes in the tax environment and the firm-specific  MCS variables. This  is 
                                                          
4 Baldenius et al. 2004 stress that most MNEs use the same set of books for tax and managerial purposes. 
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followed by a discussion of the findings and  development of the propositions  concerning the 
consequences of tax compliant transfer pricing and the design of the  MCS. Finally, suggestions for future 
research are presented, together with the overall conclusions of this study.   
Literature review  
No universally accepted framework exists to study MCS issues of transfer pricing in an international 
context. This study is guided by the domestic MCS and organisational transfer pricing literatures and the 
fiscal regulatory environment in which MNEs operate. This research domain provides our framework of 
analysis as shown in figure 1.  
Tax compliance 
In a multinational environment, the transfer pricing policy contributes to a large variety of goals, including 
profit maximisation, cash flow, sales and marketing goals; minimizing taxes, duties and tariffs; and 
achieving socio-political goals related to financial restrictions, currency fluctuations and host country 
relations (Leitch & Barrett, 1992; Dunning, 1980). Several surveys have been undertaken in the 
contingency tradition with the aim to identify the transfer pricing method used and the prime objectives of 
the transfer pricing policy (e.g. Tang, 1979, 1990; Borkowski, 1992, 1996; Cravens & Shearon, 1996; 
Cravens, 1997 etc.). The analytical literature contains a number of interesting contributions focusing on the 
dual role of transfer pricing for tax optimisation versus management control. Most of these studies assume 
MNEs to use one set of transfer pricing books (Halpirin & Srinidhi, 1991; Elitzur & Mintz, 1996; 
Schjelderup & Sorgard, 1997; Sansing, 1999; Haufler & Schjelderup, 2000; Smith, 2002a): they derive the 
optimal transfer price for each intrafirm transaction that simultaneously serves tax and performance 
evaluation goals. In contrast, a limited number of recent studies (Baldenius et al., 2004; Smith, 2002b; 
Hyde & Choe, 2005) model two distinct transfer prices, one to serve evaluation purposes and the other one 
to serve tax purposes. In practice, most MNEs insist on using one set of prices, ‘both for simplicity and in 
order to avoid the possibility that multiple transfer prices become evidence of manipulation in any disputes 
with the tax authorities’ (Baldenius et al., 2004, 592; Ernst & Young, 2001, 2003). Therefore, this study 
considers a MNE using a single set of transfer prices. SThis study provides insights from an in-depth case 
study of the MCS over time in a MNE that complies with the fiscal regulations. While the analytical 
                                                                                                                                                                            
However, they advocate the use of separate sets of books.  
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studies tend to take compliance with the tax rules as given when seeking to identify the optimal internal 
transfer price (e.g. Baldenius et al., 2004), the current study internalises the tax compliance process and 
investigates the MCS implications that follow from preparing the firm for tax compliance.  
Treating tax compliance as an endogenous variable admits the regulations and their premises into the 
MNE’s consideration of MCS design. Eden (1998) offers a comprehensive analysis of the regulations and 
Cools and Emmanuel (forthcoming) argue that the most detailed rules of tax jurisdictions will be followed 
because bi-lateral tax treaties, arbitration and advanced pricing agreements (APAs) cannot progress until 
these are satisfied. Currently , the IRS holds the distinction of articulating regulations in fine detail (IRS, s 
482,1995). 
For normal tax compliance purposes, consistent with US regulations, contemporaneous documentation for 
individual or a set of similar transactions is required. The documentation includes a functional analysis 
where the parties to the transaction are identified , the assets including intangibles are recognised and the 
risks borne by each party are ascertained. The choice of transfer pricing method has to be justified over 
other methods and this necessitates the search for comparables. Up-holding comparables requires an 
industry sector analysis, preferably in relation to the strategy being followed, in order to verify the “best 
method” of transfer pricing is selected.  Limited research and anecdotal evidence to ensure compliance 
with this level of detail reveals manuals several centimetres thick (Elliott and Emmanuel, 2000) and CD 
Rom submissions which model transfer pricing computations and assumptions. When corroboration of 
evidence is required from specialists, this is a costly and time-consuming undertaking especially as annual 
maintenance and up-dating of the documentation is needed. 
Jurisdictions, other than the IRS, are also developing and strengthening their distinct transfer pricing 
regulations within the broad guidelines of the OECD (1995) which add to the dynamics of  fiscal 
compliance. How the MNE accommodates this in practice and how the use and design of the MCS is 
affected is the focus of this study.     
The Transfer Pricing Process 
Whilst the influence of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) is seen in the frameworks of transfer pricing choice 
developed by Eccles (1985), Spicer (1988) and van Meer-Koistra (1994), these are static and offer little on 
the internal organisation and management of complex enterprises, certainly not in an international 
environment. In addition, there is no universally accepted theory of management control for MNEs. 
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We have chosen to adopt the framework of Chow et al (1999) because the major management control 
functions are incorporated in an integrated manner. The underlying assumption of this framework, in 
common with others (Merchant, 1989; Birnberg et al, 1990; Fisher,1995), is that top management has 
complete discretion to determine and fine-tune the organising, planning, evaluation and reward aspects of 
the MCS. We examine whether this assumption is tenable when tax compliant transfer pricing is adopted 
as strategic policy of the MNE.    
 
 .   
 
 
Organising controls pays attention to ‘decentralisation’ and ‘structuring of activities’. Decentralisation is 
the extent to which decision-making responsibility is delegated to lower level managers in a vertical 
hierarchy. Structuring of activities refers to the existence of written policies, rules, standardised procedures 
and manuals which specify how to and, sometimes, how not to, perform activities (Rockness & Shields, 
1984; Merchant, 1985). The second aspect contains the planning controls which are defined as 
‘participative budgeting’ and ‘standard tightness’. Participative budgeting is the extent to which 
subordinates contribute to the development and selection of the performance plan by which their superiors 
will hold them responsible  (Shields & Young, 1993). Standard tightness stands for the ex-ante probability 
that a manager can attain the plan (Chow, 1983; Merchant & Manzoni, 1989). The third aspect,  evaluating 
and rewarding controls, focuses on ‘participative performance evaluation’, ‘controllability filters’ and 
‘performance contingent financial rewards’. Participative performance evaluation refers to the extent to 
which employees contribute to the evaluation of their own performance (Briers & Hirst, 1990). 
Controllability filters are the controls which reduce the degree to which manager performance evaluations 
are subject to factors beyond the manager’s control (Demski, 1976; Merchant, 1989). Lastly, performance 
contingent financial rewards refer to the extent that managerial compensation is determined by comparing 
budgeted to actual performance (Demski & Feltham, 1978; Waller & Chow, 1985).  
 
The MCS literature has focused less on the use of the MCS than on MCS design. The application of Adler 
and Borys’ (1996) ‘enabling’ versus ‘coercive’ types of bureaucracy  provides useful guidance to study  
use made of the MCS. Ahrens and Chapman(2002,2004) interpret coercive use of the MCS as extensive 
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centralisation and preplanning  resulting in a top-down control approach. Enabling use makes it possible 
for managers to deal directly with the inevitable contingencies in their work. Its basic premise is that 
operations are not totally programmable. For an enabling use to be possible, the MCS needs to be designed 
in terms of repair, internal transparency, global transparency and flexibility (Adler & Borys, 1996; Ahrens 
& Chapman, 2002,2004). Internal transparency relates to the visibility of internal processes for 
organisational members, while global transparency relates to the visibility of the overall context in which 
organisational members perform their specific duties. The tight codification of best practice routines and 
the pressure to stick to the written manuals, however, countervail flexibility and repair. When repair 
processes are integrated with routine operations, managers participate in the development of organisational 
rules and standards by signalling and discussing problems in their practical implementation. Allowing 
managers to flexibly deal with emerging contingencies in ways that fit both local and central agendas is a 
necessary condition for an enabling use of the MCS to be possible (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004).  
 
- Insert figure 1 here - 
Research method 
An in-depth case study was undertaken to gain insight into the design and use of the MCS in one tax 
compliant MNE. Theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989) guided the selection of the case company. The 
selection process consisted of two stages. In the first place, a preliminary study was undertaken to select a 
group of potential case companies. This stage at the same time allowed the research question to be refined, 
and the set-up of the research design and analysis protocol of the in-depth study to be strengthened5. One 
selection criterion was size. Earlier practical experience  made clear that medium-sized and smaller MNEs 
had limited awareness and experience with the fiscal aspects of transfer pricing in 1998. This study 
therefore focuses on larger companies, often leaders from a market or technological point of view, 
characterised by a large number of cross-border transactions. Other criteria were industry sector, financial 
health, and  apparent lack of problems with the tax authorities.  International transfer pricing is a sensitive 
topicin certain sectors like pharmaceuticals which appear to receive especial attention. To ensure access 
                                                          
5 In addition, the preliminary study allowed the main researcher to refine her skills with interviewing 
managers on this topic and it provided the first material to be analysed using NUD*IST  software. In this 
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stood a reasonable chance of being maintained, such sectors were avoided. Financially healthy MNEs,as 
reflected in company annual reports for the prior 10 years, were targeted. Also, access would only be 
possible to MNEs that felt comfortable enough about their transfer pricing policy to exchange  information 
with an external researcher. In this way, the lack of problems with the tax authorities became a natural 
selection criterion. Four interesting companies were selected and key headquarter informants were 
interviewed.  
 
The second stage consisted of selecting one ‘best practice’ company out of the four original MNEs. A 
mature company was preferred because its history in terms of international transfer pricing was the subject 
of the study. In order to include the most detailed transfer pricing rules in the World, we selected a 
company with headquarters or subsidiaries in the US. In addition, we targeted a typical case in the sense 
that the MNE used one set of transfer pricing books (Baldenius et al., 2005; Ernst & Young, 2003). The 
main focus was on the transfer pricing policy concerning products in order that the observations in this 
study might be related to the extant transfer pricing literature. Transfer pricing regulations also differ when 
the focus is intangibles or business support services (OECD, 1995,1996,1997).  
Another criterion was the degree of access to management at different levels within the MNE.   
 
.  
 
 
 
A series of semi-structured interviews were conducted for a total of 92,5 hours. As table 1 indicates, the 
interviews involved 23 managers at different levels in the organisation. All managers were interviewed 
between 1999 and 2002. A number of them (especially the tax directors, the product division controller 
and one of the strategic business unit,SBU, controllers) were contacted regularly during this four-year 
period. The interviewees commented on their actual situation and all of them spontaneously compared the 
present to  the past.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
way, coding in NUD*IST could be refined and improved before applying the coding scheme to the main 
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- Insert table 1 here - 
 
“An emphasis on situational details unfolding over time allows qualitative research to describe processes” 
(Gephart, 2004, 455). To achieve the aim of deepening our understanding of the interaction between the 
transfer pricing policy and the MCS, an extensive search of archival documents was made. Table 2 
provides an overview of the types of documents used. 
 
                                                                    -Insert table 2 here- 
 The documents and oral transcripts were cross-validated, in the sense that the observations based on the 
documents were compared with the observations provided by the interviewees, to provide data 
triangulation and to ensure construct validity (Yin, 2003; Miles and Huberman, 1998). As in Chow et al. 
(1999), the degree of triangulation was augmented by collecting information from different types of 
managers. Trends in the regulatory changes and the conclusions emerging from the case were also 
discussed with external transfer pricing consultants and tax specialists.  
 
The design and analysis of the case study are guided by Yin (2003), Miles and Huberman (1998) and 
Eisenhardt (1989). The case study protocol includes the interview protocol, the analysis protocol and the 
selection criteria of the cases. The interview protocol guided the semi-structured interviews based on open-
ended questions relating to the literature review. Participants could answer the questions or discard them as 
they perceived the importance of the issue. The analysis is centred on the use of event listings, also called 
time-ordered matrices. These matrices are intended to capture the dynamics and processes in the case 
(Miles and Huberman, 1998). They are used as the basis to verify the researchers’ interpretation of the 
events in several feedback interviews which occurred regularly during the data collection phase. The 
analysis is supported using the qualitative data analysis package NUD*IST. Complete interview transcripts 
are coded in the NUD*IST database, as well as document summaries (Miles & Huberman) with the main 
information obtained from the documents. Apart from using the software for its store and retrieve 
functions, NUD*IST is also used for  further analysis by making use of the various questioning functions 
available. In this way, the time-ordered matrices could be drawn.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
interview data. 
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Research site  
This section describes the research site including the work flow within the Semi-conductor Product 
Division (SPD) and the tax compliant transfer pricing policy which was in place in 2001. 
The  Semiconductor Product Division 
The selected MNE is a large, industrial multinational with production facilities and sales organisations ,  
active in more than 60 countries,  employing over 150.000 people. Within this MNE, SPD was selected as 
the main research site. Compared to the MNE’s other product divisions, SPD is characterised by the most 
complex production chain and the most global operations. This product division belongs to the electronic 
system market, in which technology requires significant capital investments. SPD works in partnership 
with its customers to develop and provide standard products as well as complex system applications. The 
customers are increasingly global players. Figure 2 presents the value chain for semiconductors.    
 
- Insert figure 2 here - 
 
 Semiconductors has production sites in the USA and in Europe and this first phase is the most capital 
intensive of the process.The separated circuits are assembled and tested often in cheap labour countries, 
mostly located in Asia.  The semiconductors can be tested in the assembly plants or in a separate testing 
plant at a different location.  The finished goods are sent to regional sales organisations which represent 
SPD in the different continents (North America, Europe and Asia). Regional marketing is based on  
strategic business unit (SBU) and business line (BL) dimensions. The SBU manages the physical 
distribution processes and the BLs are responsible for commercial inventories and related obsolescence 
risks. The regional sales organisations form the connection between the production and commercial 
environment. A national sales organisation is the contact point of SPD in the country of the customer. In 
contrast to the regional sales organisations, national sales organisations do not store or distribute stocks.  A 
number of service providers located worldwide (such as the Corporate Centre, Technical Support Centres 
and Application Laboratories) take care of all activities that are not directly related to the goods flow.   
 
The semiconductors-in-progress, physically travelling from one functional (operational or commercial) 
unit to the other which cross both organisational and fiscal borders, are monitored  and steered by the BLs . 
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BLs with similar products are grouped as SBUs. SBUs formulate the product’s worldwide strategy and 
allocate assets and resources in line with the targets agreed by product division management. They also 
communicate with key executives of strategic customers and suppliers. The BLs have to implement the 
SBU strategy in a particular product or market segment. While the BL general manager is located in one 
country, every BL is active on an international scale and use is made  of SPD factories and departments all 
over the World. BLs undertake joint marketing initiatives with the sales organisations. The BLs also 
incorporate product knowledge and develop new products, often with support from the laboratories. The 
organisation is therefore similar to a matrix with the value chain identifying functions (production, 
assembly, testing and sales) and product availability and development (SBUs and BLs) recognising 
customers and markets. 
Semiconductors’ Transfer Pricing Policy 
In 2001, SPD made use of three types of transfer prices. Since the number of production steps undertaken 
in a certain plant  varies, a price is calculated for every separate step. The transfer price between functional 
units is the sum of the prices for all steps already undertaken. ‘Production’ prices are calculated for each 
stage in production: budgeted costs are augmented with uniform, fixed profit uplift. ‘Assembly and test’ 
prices include a uniform, fixed , but lower, profit mark-up  applied on top of budgeted costs.  The transfer 
price between an assembly and test facility and a regional sales organisation is the aggregate of the 
production and assembly costs plus profit marks-up.The transfer price between the national and regional 
sales organisations is the resale price minus a uniform, fixed profit margin. Resale price minus transfer 
prices apply a lower profit margin percentage. The three percentages reflected the functions undertaken, 
the assets involved and the risks assumed by the interacting parties. The product transfer prices are 
indicated in figure 3.  
 
- Insert figure 3 here - 
 
For all cost-plus transfer prices, budgeted costs are used to encourage efficiency at production and 
assembly. The corporate controller at SPD stressed that transfer prices based on actual costs would provide 
no incentive to the supplying division to control costs:  
‘using actual costs would allow the supplying divisions to pass along cost inefficiencies to the 
buying party’ (August 1999).  
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In order to meet the tax authorities’ requirement to use actual costs, an adjustment is made at the end of the 
year. Any adjustments need to be documented.  
  
The tax compliant transfer pricing policy is used in two ways. On the one hand, transfer prices are used to 
invoice the subsequent functional entities along the value chain. At an aggregate level, they contribute to 
the results of the geographical sites which are of particular interest to the national tax 
authorities.Additionally,  these transfer prices influence the results of the SBUs and BLs which are 
responsible for steering the semiconductors through the value chain. From the moment the products are 
sent from the product bank to an assembly and test facility, the production transfer price becomes a cost for 
the BL. Similarly, the BLs pay for the assembly and test activities, for the sales efforts and for the use of 
other services.   
 
Analysis 
 
The tax compliant transfer pricing policy of this MNE emerged over a number of years and, here, we trace 
the dynamic inter-actions with the MCS using the framework in figure 1.The evidence relates to the time 
period 1993-2001. 
Strategy and Organisation Design 
A study of  transfer pricing policy cannot ignore the strategic focus of a company (Eccles, 1985). Two 
strategic phases can be distinguished at corporate level. In the period 1993 – 1998, the strategic  aim  was  
to  recover the MNE’s profitability. From 1998 on, the main  focus was on shareholder value: creating 
value became the priority in any decision-making.  In 1993, corporate management significantly simplified 
the product costing and budgeting system and insisted on its ‘consistent application in all product 
divisions’ (Semiconductors controllers meeting, November 1995). The aim was to increase employee 
understanding of the costing system  so that cost reducing suggestions might emerge at all levels. This 
strategic focus on simplicity and traceability was reinforced by the increasing need for transparency for 
transfer pricing tax compliance, promoted by the Corporate Tax department as  explained below. In 1998, 
corporate management implemented a version of Economic Value Added (EVA) to measure financial 
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performance of all product divisions. In the same year, corporate management gave the Corporate Quality 
department the responsibility to develop the Balanced Score Card (BSC) and to introduce it in all product 
divisions (1998 Annual Report) .  
 
At SPD, the simplified costing and budgeting system was adopted in 1993. To contribute further to the 
corporate goal of recovering profitability, Semiconductors management introduced strategic benchmarking 
that was strictly applied. In addition, the corporate priorities to install clear and transparent systems were 
among the driving factors for restructuring the product division: between 1996 and 2001 Semiconductors 
gradually moved towards a matrix structure. Along the product axis of the matrix, BLs were regrouped 
into SBUs according to the similarity of their products and processes. The strategies of individual SBUs 
ranged from prospector towards defender strategies and from differentiator to low cost strategies (Miles & 
Snow, 1979), reflecting the technology involved. Along the functional axis of the matrix, operational and 
sales activities were increasingly centralised. In 1996, a coordinating ‘SBU Assembly and Testing’ was 
established to manage the assembly and test plants (controller Assembly and Testing SBU December 
2000) and from 1998 on, an increasing number of production plants were allocated to the ‘SBU 
Production’ (product division industrial planner July 2001). While plants used to be dedicated to a certain 
BL, most of them were decoupled from their BL by 2000. In that same year, the regional sales 
organisations were regrouped under a global selling structure and organised along customer-line segments 
(automotive, consumer etc.). By July 2001, the organisational restructuring of SPD was complete (a BL 
human resource (HR) manager, April 2001, a BL general manager, August 2001). Against this background 
of  strategic dynamics the potential influence of the tax compliant transfer pricing policy can be assessed 
(see table 3).   
 
- Insert table 3 here - 
Transfer Pricing Design and Tax Compliance 
By 1993 the Corporate Tax department (CT) was aware of the developments in the fiscal environment, 
especially regarding US proposals to strengthen transfer pricing regulations, audits and  penalties. At that 
time  
‘we did not actively oversee the transfer pricing policy in the product divisions, nor did we have a 
written version of their policy. Until 1993 there were a number of general transfer pricing 
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principles, but the parties involved had some freedom to negotiate transfer prices. … From 1993 on, 
the fulfilment of the compliance requirements became the primary goal for Corporate Fiscal.  
(Corporate Tax director, November 2000).  
 
CT’s main concern was the potential incurrence of economic double taxation (internal letter,December 
1993). To avoid any misunderstanding with the tax authorities, CT urged the product divisions to explicitly 
prove that their transfer pricing policy for goods  respected the arm’s length principle. The internal 
documents were required to meet the most detailed and strict tax proposals of the IRS As the IRS and other 
tax authorities strengthened their regulations, CT continued to educate managers at all organisational levels 
over 1993 – 2001.The importance of using fiscally acceptable transfer prices and of clear and 
contemporaneous documentation was regularly emphasised. In addition, internal audits were introduced to 
monitor correct application of the formal transfer pricing policy (minutes meeting, June 1995, product 
division internal auditor, October 2000). 
 
Transfer pricing was an important issue for SPD due to the global character of its activities. An official 
SPD policy was developed first by providing short answers to the information requests of CT (Finance & 
Accounting department letter, December 1993) and then a 4-page  document emerged, including a rough 
functional analysis (internal memo, September 1994). Stimulated by CT, a SPD Transfer Pricing 
Workgroup was installed in 1995 to revise the transfer pricing policy. Its aim was to increase consistency 
throughout the product division and to draft a transfer pricing document that could be used for fiscal 
compliance (minutes Workgroup, April 1995, May 1995): 
‘Such a transfer pricing document needs to be provided by the business because semiconductors is 
an extremely complex environment’ (Corporate Tax director November 1999). 
 
   
Using Eccles’ (1995) characterisation of administrative processes, we can describe the development of the 
transfer pricing policy over the time period of the study.  The Workgroup consisted of nine members: four 
financial managers, two corporate tax managers, one BL manager, one plant manager and one person from 
SPD’s legal department (minutes Workgroup, May 1995). However,  other managers at all levels in the 
organisation were invited to discuss the policy during the revision (Semiconductors’ management team, 
corporate internal auditors, controllers and fiscal managers located in different countries, plant managers, 
plant controllers, BL managers and controllers, SBU managers, controllers from the Chief Financial 
Officer’s (CFO) office and from the Chief Operations Officer’s (COO) office, managers from the regional 
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sales organisations) (internal memo 1995, emails September 1995, faxes June, September and October 
1995).  The starting point of the Workgroup was the existing transfer pricing practice because the work 
flow would continue to form the foundation of the revised policy. However,  transparency and consistency 
needed to improve to justify  the policy to the tax authorities. The revised policy consisted of  an 
unambiguous formula that had to be universally applied: the uniform approach implied that the same 
transfer pricing method was used for all semiconductors crossing the borders of their organisational units, 
wherever these were located geographically. For all manufacturing activities the budgeted costs were the 
base and the same fixed profit uplift6 was added. The national sales organisations needed to pay the 
regional sales organisations with their sales price minus a fixed, predetermined profit margin. Adjustments 
were not allowed other than under exceptional circumstances (Minutes Workgroup, June 1995, Note 1995, 
Memo March 1996, emails 1995, 1996, administrative instruction, July 1999). The possibility of price 
negotiations was eliminated: 
‘The product division Semiconductors uses a transparent transfer pricing model. The main point is 
that transfer pricing is not determined by negotiations or internal arrangements, but that it is just a 
fairly measured system. When the model shows a structural defect, it will be discussed at product 
division  level’ (a SBU controller October 2000 ). 
 The consequence of using the models is that we avoid endless discussions on plate prices, that we 
reach easy cost allocations between our plants and the BLs. In addition, it leads to a simpler 
budgeting process’ (Semiconductors Vice president and SBU controller, March 2001). 
 
 The transfer prices were based on budgeted costs, and adjusted to actual costs at year end for fiscal 
reasons (minutes Workgroup June 1995). Cost data were used, together with internal and external 
comparables when available (a BL site controller, March 2001).  
‘The budgeted transfer prices depend on the expected loads in the plants. … Normally the prices are 
benchmarked and should be best in class’ (a BL controller September 2001). 
 
Internal benchmarking had been introduced in 1994 in the light of the strategic objective of recovering 
profitability. External benchmarking came in 1995, induced both by this strategic objective and by tax 
compliance rules. The IRS requires transfer prices  to be compared to third party references in order to 
prove their arm’s length character.  
‘The strategic reasons and the tax compliance reasons to introduce external benchmarking seem to 
reinforce each other’ ( a BL controller October 2000). 
 
                                                          
6 Only in the 1999 transfer pricing document would the mark-up for production transfer prices  become 
differentiated from assembly and test prices.  
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 In general, transfer prices were calculated once a year. Revisions were possible after approval by the 
product division’s price board, but would only be implemented if substantial and external reasons like 
currency swings or changed purchase prices occurred (controllers conference 1996, Memo and emails, 
March 1996). 
 ‘transfer prices are considered twice a year. In case of significantly different market prices, it is 
possible to change prices. However this has never been done, since our model tries to track long-
term evolution’ (a controller COO office, December 2000). 
 
Several managers added that adjustments were avoided in order to maximise the clarity, both for internal 
management and for the tax authorities:  
‘there are hardly any changes in the year in order to avoid confusion’(a plant general manager July 
2001).  
 
 When conflict arose, SPD managers had to prepare a case and present it to product division management. 
One SBU controller gave an example of an adjustment of transfer prices because of the pressure on the 
chip market.  
‘A structural problem was felt in the production price model. We first had a discussion at SBU 
level. Later, we discussed this with the COO office. … During a thorough investigation, different 
aspects, semiconductor type, prices, package costs, etc were scrutinised... Product division 
management exceptionally gave in and adjusted the transfer price. Even under these circumstances, 
the product division is not keen to allow an adjustment of transfer prices’ (a SBU controller, 
October 2000) 
 
In order to meet the tax compliance requirements, CT requested SPD’s Finance and Accounting 
department to implement a ‘key document retention policy’:  
‘Retention of all relevant transfer pricing documents is very important for tax audits are to be 
expected sooner or later in one or more countries’  (letter August 1995, memo May 1995).  
 
By the end of 1995, the Semiconductors transfer pricing document consisted of 21 pages7. It was published 
by CT in 1996 as a part of an enterprise-wide transfer pricing document. External consultants checked the 
document (as well as later versions) and provided more detailed evidence of comparables. Also after 1995, 
SPD management made efforts to improve the consistent application of the transfer pricing policy. While 
the 1995 Workgroup had conducted a detailed functional analysis to be included in the documentation, 
‘we notice that certain developments … in the Semiconductors environment have quite an impact 
on the risk factors earlier set and defined. Together with the relevant corporate departments and the 
members of the product division’s management team we reviewed the functional analysis… The 
main conclusion is that in the manufacturing sector the risk factors in the production plants have 
developed differently from the assembly and testing area. For that reason the profit uplift has been 
                                                          
7 The contents of the 1996 and 1999 Transfer Pricing document are summarised in table 4.  
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separated providing each of the two sectors with their own related , risk analysis based profit uplift’ 
(internal letter CFO February 1999).  
 
The reinvestigation of the functional profile showed that production required increasingly higher capital 
investments than assembly and test processes. The mark-ups were therefore revised so that production 
prices would contain a higher mark-up than assembly and testing prices. This adjustment was included in 
the revised 1999 official transfer pricing document (transfer pricing document February 1999). 
 
The MNE had experience of a number of audits, more specifically in countries trying to catch up with the 
detailed US regulations (Corporate Tax team, November 1999), but no significant problems had been 
encountered during the period under study. Maintaining documentation was the responsibility of the 
production, assembly and testing and national sales organisations.  
‘At that level, every step is tracked, especially at production plant and assembly and test level. 
Much more at the functional level, and less at BL level since they do not receive real invoices. The 
whole tracking needs to be transparent at any moment. At that level the fiscal audit takes place. The 
different entities need to be able to prove that they follow the officially installed transfer pricing 
policy. … On the other hand, all decisions concerning new production plants are taken at product 
division level. Because of the need for a centralised coordination, it has no meaning to leave the 
setting of transfer prices to the businesses. Coordination needs to be done at the central level, in 
order not to lose the justification towards the tax authorities. From that point of view, SBUs and 
BLs are never involved. There is the central model, and if exceptions are necessary because it does 
not work well for 100%, the SBU will try to improve it’ (a SBU controller, October 2000). 
 
- Insert table 4 here - 
Summary 
Table 4 summarises the dynamics in terms of fiscal transfer pricing compliance. We observe that the 
decision to comply with fiscal transfer pricing regulation permeated through the different levels of the 
organisation. Managers at all levels were involved in revising the transfer pricing policy and held 
responsible for compliance and implementation. In addition, an internal audit team was appointed to 
monitor application of the transfer pricing policy.    
MCS Design  
We now examine the dynamics of the MCS, guided by the Chow et al (1999) framework for the same 
period as when the transfer pricing policy was being developed..  
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Organising controls  
From 1993, the priority given to tax compliance at the highest level of the MNE led to uniform and 
universally applied transfer pricing methods in SPD. Tax compliance motives reinforced the trend that was 
set by the simplification of the product costing and budgeting system which were introduced for strategic 
reasons (minutes Workgroup, June 1995). In addition, both the strategic and tax compliance objectives 
benefited from the restructuring (1996 – 2001) of SPD. After the creation of the SBU Assembly and 
Testing in 1996, a single, uniform transfer pricing policy governed the transfers between this SBU and the 
regional sales organisations. Similarly, the establishment of the  Production SBU in 1998, made the 
transfer pricing policy more transparent. In the same year, the transfer pricing model for the national sales 
organisations was simplified: an identical EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and Tax) percentage was 
attributed to every country. In sum, the transfer pricing policy became designed and managed in an 
increasingly centralised way. Interviewees at SBU and BL level appeared to accept this degree of 
centralisation :  
‘The central transfer pricing policy is important in the defence towards the tax authorities. The BL 
is kept outside of how the product division is organising tax issues with the tax authorities’ (a SBU 
controller, October 2000).  
 
However, the acceptance of this degree of centralisation was not regarded by all as an  advantage.  
‘Today, transfer pricing has mainly become a matter for the department of Finance and Accounting. 
If I can add my personal opinion, I think transfer pricing should be used as an instrument to 
stimulate the different organisations towards optimal behaviour. For stock management, the 
implementation of the current transfer pricing policy does sometimes come at the expense of 
flexibility’ (a BL systems and procedures manager, July 2001).  
 
One BL general manager felt that his business creation task was seriously restricted.  
‘I would prefer a closer co-operation between the businesses and the manufacturing plants. In order 
to reach competitive advantages, we should be able to involve the plants more into the basic 
business. One of our customers is a Chinese producer of TV sets. … the Chinese end customers do 
not ask for a perfect image or a perfect sound, they just want the TV to work. Therefore, the chips 
we offer are too expensive for the region. Still, in the total chain, it can be an interesting business. 
While marketers would say: the price is too low, we do not want this business, from a strategic 
point of view, thinking through the whole chain, this would be a wrong decision from the business 
creation side they would take a wrong decision based on the internal price construction – this is 
because we have a uniform transfer pricing system.’ (August 2001).   
 
The BL could not flexibly adjust its transfer prices to support sales in that region without a special request 
made to SPD management. Entrepreneurship at this BL seemed to  be  discouraged because of the rigidity 
caused by the tax compliant transfer pricing policy.  
 
 22
Related to the organising controls is ‘structuring of activities’.  The uniform transfer pricing procedures 
had to be respected under all circumstances. This requirement was emphasised by the role of the internal  
auditors to monitor application of the centrally determined transfer pricing policy. Several interviewees 
claimed that the resulting transfer pricing policy had a neutral role in the organisation,  
‘…decisions at SBU level are not much influenced by today’s transfer pricing mechanism. It is 
managed at BL level where it works in quite a neutral way’ (a SBU controller, October 2000). 
 
However, an analysis of the dynamics of semiconductor market conditions provides another perspective.  
Between 1993 and 2001 the semiconductors market showed an overall growth trend but was cyclical with 
highly volatile growth rates (Mc Clean Report, 2001). After an unprofitable period, the semiconductors 
market became more favourable in  1995-1998. At the end of 1999, the World economy surged and the 
boom was characterised by full utilisation of all production utilities. By the end of 2000, however, the 
situation started to deteriorate. In the Spring of 2001, the downturn  of the cycle  began to result in 
inventory adjustments, overcapacity and the start of a global recession. During the recession, BL managers 
started to put pressure on the transfer pricing system: they tried to get lower transfer prices in order to meet 
targets and  survive the crisis. BL managers were considered to be entrepreneurs along the product axis but 
their autonomy to outsource was conditional on production and A&T operating at full capacity. The same 
request came from  the functional plant managers who wanted to use lower prices, out of fear that the BLs 
would not place their orders internally anymore, and would go to external suppliers but the plant managers 
had no freedom to serve external customers. The COO argued that the outsourcing decision should never 
be based on price since the price is determined through benchmarking with the market.  During 2001, all 
production decisions were centralised and placed under  direct SPD management control, something which 
was infeasible before the creation of the SBUs .  BL managers again felt restricted in their business 
creation facilities by the rigidity of the centrally imposed transfer pricing policy. Table 5 summarises the 
events in terms of the organising controls.  
 
- Insert table 5 here - 
Planning controls 
The calculation of the transfer prices in SPD was based on budgeted costs which adopted a simplified 
costing  system in 1993. Strategic benchmarking  became a part of the budgeting process with internal  
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introduced in 1994 and external benchmarking, where possible being  introduced from 1995 (controllers 
meeting, November 1995, Annual Report, 1998). Internal benchmarking was consistent with the strategic 
dynamics. External benchmarking was driven by two related factors: strategy and tax compliance (a BL 
controller, October 2000). The fiscal  regulations of the IRS required transfer prices to be compared to 
third party references in order to prove their arm’s length character. The comparison with benchmarking is 
obvious. The creation of the central SBUs Production and Assembly and Testing facilitated the application 
of internal and external benchmarking in the operational environment. Benchmarking was strictly applied 
in the manufacturing plants, and encouraged them to aim at ‘best in class’ prices (1999 Transfer Pricing 
document, a BL site controller, March 2001). The benchmarks were centrally determined at SPD. 
 
Over the period of analysis, budgeting was described as a two-way process:  
‘Budget proposals start from bottom-up expectations, and are then corrected top-down in order to 
reflect strategic intentions. Both processes come together during a negotiation process, which makes 
the SBU and the BLs quite aligned’ (a BL controller, October 2000).  
However, benchmarking and top-down considerations received more weight than bottom-up 
considerations and lower-level managers did not seem to experience real participation (a BL HR manager, 
April 2001):  
‘The final budget could differ quite substantially from the proposal by the BL. … The proposal is 
judged against two elements: a historical comparison - is it realistic, can we expect a strange swing 
and why? - and the strategic intention that has been agreed upon in the SBU, which is even more 
important. For these reasons, the BL proposal is often amended’ (a SBU controller, October 2000).  
 
By the time the BSC was introduced, the emphasis on traditional annual budgeting lessened in favour of 
rolling forecasts and external benchmarking (1998 Annual Report, Corporate Quality Director, April 2001)  
 
In terms of target setting, all targets were set up to be SMART (Specific, Measurable, Applicable, Realistic 
and Time related) (a HR manager, September 2001). SPD determined the financial measures of the BSC 
and EVA was added to EBIT and cash flow as targets. EVA was calculated by applying a number of 
corrections to EBIT, particularly for working capital and, notably, tax. Both corrections were centrally 
determined and could not be influenced by the managers under evaluation. The inclusion of the tax 
correction factor, which tracked jurisdicial changes in different countries, may be viewed as a means to 
promote respect for the centrally imposed tax compliant transfer pricing policy. In contrast, the 
competence and process elements of the BSC were set at BL and plant level. 
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           “In terms of the evolution of performance evaluation over time, the focus is now clearly more on 
financial targets and returns. It went from attention to the recovery of profitability to shareholder value and 
growth potential. Elements of concern are found back in the way managers are steered and in the way 
targets are formulated.”(HR manager BL, 2001).   
 
 The introduction of the BSC was significant for target setting:  
‘In terms of target setting, controllability is important. The financial elements are determined at the 
central level, while departmental targets are determined by the people in the business themselves’ (a 
BL HR manager, September 2001).  
 
In terms of the planning controls, we observe an increased emphasis on benchmarking uniform targets 
where lower management participation seems restricted.  Lower level manager participation to set targets 
or change benchmarks appears  restricted and tightness, especially of financial targets, appears to depend 
on the perceptions of SPD management. The facts are summarised in Table 6.  
 
- Insert table 6 here - 
Evaluating and rewarding controls  
The performance of individual managers was evaluated in relation to predetermined targets. The 
introduction of the BSC , through the Corporate Quality department , in 1998 meant an important 
development for performance evaluation in SPD.  
‘In our BSC, we have the four elements. The financial ones are the top ones. … the lagging 
indicators. Monthly we report on EBIT. …For the customer related items, we look at what the 
requirements are….Process measures are internal, and should be a leading indicator. The fourth one 
is competence, where we measure the number of improvements made, how many people with the 
right competence are at the right place etc.’ (corporate quality director, April 2001).   
 
In 2000, the BSC was reviewed:  
‘The product division is still searching for the variables that are best for driving people, given that 
in this sector, the cyclical and dynamic market has a major influence’ (corporate quality director, 
April 2001). 
 
Top Management at SPD was responsible for determining the ‘external’ (financial and customer-related) 
performance indicators, while the ‘internal’ performance indicators (competence and process measures) 
were determined by the lower level managers. Even with the introduction of the BSC, interviewees 
stressed that the financial measures received the primary focus:  
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‘In terms of the evolution of performance evaluation over time, the focus is now clearly more on 
financial targets and returns. It went from attention to the recovery of profitability to shareholder 
value and growth potential. ’ (a BL HR manager, April 2001). 
 
But clearly the BSC enabled performance evaluators to incorporate non-financial elements:  
‘The BSC has in any case the advantage of enabling the soft aspects to be measured in a better way. 
HRM is learning to experiment with it…I’m getting prepared to make these elements more 
concrete. … Moreover, evaluation has become  more acceptable on a lower level’ (a BL HR 
manager, August 2001). 
 
 
 
The introduction of the BSC with a greater recognition of non-financial performance indicators is , 
arguably, a logical response to the lack of control managers within SPD exercise over transfer 
pricing.Whilst included in the EBIT,cash flow and EVA measures for production and A&T, the 
benchmarked, unchanging, budgeted transfer prices can only be bettered by reducing actual costs. An 
advanced plant manager (September,2001) reported 
                    “I try to make the BSC reflect as closely as possible what the operators and engineers see in 
the factyory, and make these visible elements find a connection with the financial programme… multiply 
shipments by the production transfer price, deduct costs and you get EBIT.” 
The plant manager, knowing the transfer price, could estimate the EBIT for each load and EBIT less the 
centrally determined weighted average cost of capital multiplied by inventory and deducting the tax charge 
gave EVA. Hence, productivity, shipments and other non-financials relating to process and competence 
become primary controllable items for plant managers. The main focus is to reduce costs. 
Similarly, the national sales organisations recognised that the financial targets could only be out-performed 
by increasing sales volumes. The fixed profit percentage embedded in the resale minus transfer price did 
not, however, distinguish between higher and lower margin products. SPD management (Vice-president 
and SBU controller, April 2001) realised this. 
                           “We are currently discussing whether it is good to evaluate based on sales volume, and 
whether the evaluationshould not be based on margins, on product mix. From a managerial point of view it 
makes sense to investigate whether the sales parties get the maximal value out of the market. I stress this is 
a managerial, not a fiscal issue…This current discussion would again open up the way towards more 
dialogue between the BL and the sales organisation, so that a higher margin can be squeezed out of the 
market. It would lead to margin targets in the countries and in the regions. The result is that sales 
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organisations might ask again for the transfer prices to be adapted. But such adjustment of transfer prices is 
what we at SBU level want to avoid.” 
For the BLs and SBUs which are responsible for products worldwide, the combination of intractable 
transfer prices and an emphasis on financial performance indicators meant initiatives such as a market 
penetration strategy had to be considered carefully. 
                                   “It is also possible that a BL wants to participate in that market because of strategic 
reasons. When the BL is not profitable in that market and expects it will become profitable within one year 
and a half, it will accept the losses. It is a strategic discussion that can lead to pressures to adjust transfer 
pricing.However, SPD wants to keep the transfer pricing system simple, and does not want to start to 
adjusting it.”(Vice president SPD and SBU controller and SBU controller, March 2001). 
Despite the limited control managers within SPD can exercise over the financial indicators, non-attainment 
resulted in no cash bonus award. Reasonable explanations of deviation in terms of non-financial targets 
can lead to a bonus being given (Bonus system manual, July 1998). The bonus system is further 
complicated by the number of performance indicators and weightings. Typically the financials (EBIT, cash 
flow, EVA) are not the single most important (25%) because group (30%) and site or departmental targets 
(30%) are more heavily weighted. Key project metrics related to BSC competence and process comprise 
15%. Some differentiation is apparent in the form site or departmental targets take and also key project 
metrics which suggests these are tailored to individual managers, consistent with the intentions of the BSC. 
However, it is unclear whether the bonus awarded for financial performance is greater than that awarded 
for good performance along the remaining dimensions. During the downturn in 2001 when SPD 
management took over all operational decisions, all bonus payments were suspended. (HR manager, 
September,2001). 
The combined introduction of the BSC and the performance contingent financial rewards scheme in 
Europe in 1998 appears to be under continuous review. The demands of accommodating multiple 
performance indicators and weightings has stimulated some to re-emphasise the financials only (SPD, 
COO, September 2001) whilst others favour further refinement  (plant manager, assembley, June 2001).   
 
Overall the evaluating and rewarding controls suggest a limited increase to the extent competence and 
process performance indicators and targets can be selected.  Managers within SPD experienced a reduction 
in extraneous factors influencing their financial evaluation but controllable outcomes are more visible by 
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examining non-financials such as productivity or shipment deliveries.  The apparently sophisticated 
rewards scheme distinguishes attainment of financial and non-financial indicators of performance but the 
motivational impact is difficult to gauge.  Particularly at the sales organisations, effort maybe undirected 
and at BLs, initiative may be stifled by the emphasis on financial measures.  Nevertheless, there is an 
indication of performance contingent rewards evolving within the MNE to effect all levels of managers.      
           
 
up  
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Discussion  
 
 
From the mid-1990s, fiscal regulations relating to  international transfer pricinghas shown a marked 
increase in a  number of countries.  The ‘political visibility’ (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) of the MNE 
under study made it a potential target for  upcoming transfer pricing audits, especially at times of growth in 
the global market.  Furthermore, corporate and product division managers explained that  
‘our MNE has regular contacts with national governments worldwide for many other reasons than 
for transfer pricing. An example is the application for a patent or a technical licence. If our MNE 
would set up its transfer pricing policy to shift all profits to the low tax countries – even if it would 
be able to cover itself completely from a fiscal point of view – we would not  count on a lot of 
goodwill from the tax authorities’ (product division controller, August 2000). 
 
The chronological analysis, summarised in the time-ordered matrices of this  case study, reveal the 
dynamics of the complex inter-actions between tax compliance and the design and use of the MCS.SPD 
installed a uniform and transparent transfer pricing policy at the request of CT and MNE headquarter 
management. A single set of transfer pricing methods and records was used for both management control 
and tax compliance purposes. We observe that the tax compliant transfer pricing policy permeated the 
different levels of the organisation: all managers were requested to comply with this uniform policy. In 
addition, to ensure the consistent implementation of the  policy throughout the organisation, monitoring of 
transfer pricing became one of the main tasks of the internal audit team. The corporate focus on tax 
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compliance particularly influenced the design of the MCS. Proposition 1 is therefore formulated as 
follows:  
 
Centralisation and greater structuring of activities appear to be a direct consequence of the decision to 
establish a uniform, tax compliant transfer pricing policy. From 1993 on, CT staff  influenced and 
promoted  the need for detailed transfer pricing documentation. In 1995, a Workgroup was installed at 
product division level to review the transfer pricing policy in accordance with the fiscal requirements. An 
important objective was to make the transfer pricing policy of this complex and large product division 
understandable for divisional managers and outsiders like the tax authorities. The Workgroup  further 
streamlined the policy to formulate it as simply and uniformly as possible.  The CT department undertook 
the same role in other product divisions in order that the MNE had an official transfer transfer pricing 
document.   An important part of the transfer pricing documentation consisted of the functional analysis, 
and data about comparables in order  to justify the transfer price . The functional analysis seems to have 
played an important role in the decision to restructure activities. By recognising the same functions, 
wherever they were located geographically, the same transfer pricing method could be applied. A transfer 
pricing document retention policy was established to ensure that all relevant transfer pricing information 
was kept on a contemporaneous basis. SPD’s documentation contained the transfer pricing model from 
which deviations were only exceptionally allowed. CT no longer allowed transfer pricing negotiations 
across the product division because negotiated transfer prices are incompatible with the arm’s length 
principle (OECD,1995). 
  By 2001, the restructuring of the product division’s design was completed. Production, and assembly and 
testing were recognised as separate SBUs. In addition, BLs and SBUs were reorganised and regrouped. 
Greater central control was then exercised in that all similar, functional activities, assuming similar risks,  
were expected to perform at similar levels determined by the internal or external benchmarks or 
comparables. The earlier simplification of the budgeting and costing system enabled the development. The 
consistent application of the uniform transfer pricing formula resulted in the removal of any anomaly 
affecting the comparability of performance of similar organisational units, both within and outside SPD, 
when external benchmarks were available. Benchmarks were centrally determined and rarely changed in 
the annual budget. As a result, corporate management’s capability to provide central direction improved 
under the evolving organising controls. 
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The need for participative budgeting lessened given the change in organising controls. Production 
scheduling to ensure full capacity utilisation of production and A&T plants became feasible at Group and 
SPD. Confidence in the benchmarks gave planning a degree of certainty and simultaneously provided 
universal performance criteria for all similar functions undertaking similar risks. The use of external 
benchmarks reflected competitors’ achievements and potentially challenging targets for internal operations 
to attain. 
The combined effect of the evolution of organising and planning controls seemed to have a mixed 
influence on participative performance evaluation. Financial performance indicators reflected managerial 
controllability within SPD to a lower extent. Group and SPD management set the benchmarks for transfer 
pricing and, for EVA, the capital charge and tax correction rates. Plant and sales organisation managers 
influenced cost and sales volume decisions respectively but within a centrally planned production 
schedule. Operational measures , such as, the number of shipments, customer response times,sales by 
segment, production yields gained in importance as controllable , lead indicators. The BSC formalised 
their prominence by inclusion under process and competence factors. At the time of this study , 
participation over non-finacials appears to have increased whilst controllability over financials diminished. 
The award of cash bonus depended on strict attainment of financials but not the non-financials. Reasonable 
explanations of deviations below competence and process measures might still trigger a bonus. The 
rewards are also contingent on departmental or site and group targets being met. 
               Proposition 1; 
              Adoption of a tax compliant transfer pricing policy triggers a review of the MCS initially in terms    
of organising controls and then with effect  on planning, evaluation and reward controls.   
 
 In several respects, the implementation of MCS design changes following the tax compliance strategy 
Can be viewed as enabling. The educating  role of CT to increase SPD managerial awareness and to 
involve a cross-section of managers in the Workshop to develop the transfer pricing documentation 
illustrate this. Arguably, internal and global transparency clarified the terms and processes of intra-group 
trade. Once implemented, however, the scope for managers within SPD to “repair” comparables or to deal 
flexibly with changing market conditions is extremely constrained. The uniform application and 
monitoring of the transfer pricing methods created the impression of totally programmable operations 
reinforced by extensive documentation. Trends in organising and planning controls to centralise intra-
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group relationships suggest the use of an increasingly coercive bureaucratic MCS. For every exception to 
the documented policy, SPD management approval is required. This included decisions concerning 
comparables or benchmarks, outsourcing and market initiatives. 
Proposition 2:  
Adoption of a tax compliant transfer pricing policy increases the coercive, as opposed to enabling 
use of the MCS in MNEs. 
 
 
 
The inability of SPD lower managers to participate and change the rules concerning transfer pricing 
reduced their flexibility and repair. As a consequence, the capacity to innovate and inaugurate change is 
stifled. For example, BL managers following a market penetration strategy needed  to show short-term 
gains or live with the consequences of the performance contingent reward scheme. Initiatives to open new 
markets, such as China, appeared financially unviable under the uniform  transfer pricing policy. When 
faced with economic crisis, top management reaction was to centralise operational decisions to maintain 
capacity utilisation as far as possible. The coercive bureaucracy ensured the transfer pricing policy 
remained intact.  
In the domestic context, Eccles recognised  that “pressures for uniformity in transfer pricing policies will 
be based on the advantages of administrative simplicity and concerns about fairness” (1985,256). The 
pervasive effect of adopting a tax compliant policy in the international setting suggests that commercial 
flexibility and innovation will be severely constrained. 
Proposition 3:  
Adoption of a tax compliant transfer pricing policy limits the discretion of management to be 
innovative when facing dynamic environments.  
 
When researchers seek to  understand the design and use of the MCS in complex, modern-day enterprises, 
such as MNEs,the priority corporate management affords tax compliance requires consideration. Despite 
attempts to gain alternative explanations through negative case reasoning, our study proposes an extension 
of the contingency literature in order to include tax compliant transfer pricing as an endogenous 
consideration in examining the MCS.  This represents an extension of existing contingency theory 
frameworks (Chenhall, 2003; Luft & Shields, 2003; Fisher, 1995). It is by no means clear whether non-
compliant transfer pricing policies inter-act with the design and use of the MCS in a different way.Neither 
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is it possible to speculate whether degrees of tax compliance are feasible or equally influential. The 
dominant view taken by this MNE favoured the use of the same transfer pricing policy in daily business 
activities as the best defence against fiscal intrusion and enquiry. 
 
Conclusions 
This study investigated the  interactions between one MNE’s approach to tax compliance and the design 
and use of the MCS. Insights are gained from an in-depth case study in this established and successful 
MNE which used  the same transfer pricing system for tax compliance and internal management. We find 
that the consequences of transfer pricing tax compliance permeated the different levels of the organisation 
and the controls of the MCS.  The initial effect concerned  the increased degree of centralisation and 
structuring of activities (Chow et al., 2003) stimulated by the need for a uniform policy which provides 
justification for fiscal authorities. In the longer run, planning and evaluating and rewarding controls were 
also affected. Target setting became a pseudo-participation exercise .  The lower degree of controllability 
that managers could exercise in terms of transfer pricing and the related financial results was partly 
compensated by the introduction of the BSC and the recognition of process and competence performance 
measures.  The BSC enabled managers to be additionally evaluated on self-selected, non-financial 
performance measures but the reward and performance evaluation system remained financially focused 
and distinguished attainment in terms of financial and non-financial measures.  During the period under 
study, the MCS forced managers towards decision execution rather than decision-making due to the 
uniform transfer pricing policy which needed to be consistently applied under all circumstances. Coercive 
application of the tax compliant transfer pricing policy therefore limits managerial discretion to focus on 
efficiency and constrains the scope to innovate and improve effectiveness.   
Our main conclusion is that the priority affordedtax compliance impacted on the design and use of the 
MCS. We therefore support the notion of recognising fiscal regulation as a contingent variable to examine 
MNE internal processes in future studies.  
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Figure 2: The value chain within the product division Semiconductors in 2001 
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Figure 3: Product transfer pricing in the product division Semiconductors in 2001 
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Table 1: Types of archival documents used for analysis   
(111 in total, prepared between December 1993 and July 2001)  
Type MNE document External document
organisational organigrams internal 
flow charts of logistics chain internal 
annual report published information
company description published in annual report
MNE website public information
official TP documents internal confidential: only for the tax authorities
memoranda on TP towards tax regulatory bodies
TP price models internal/confidential
price calculations internal excel file 
administrative TP instructions internal/confidential
memos internal
minutes of meetings internal
internal letters internal
discussion notes internal
emails internal communication
emails: follow up interviews sent to the researcher
internal memoranda internal/confidential
faxes internal correspondence
BSC of subunit internal 
performance evaluation of plants internal 
target allocation schemes internal/confidential
bonus agreements internal/confidential
performance appraisals internal
slide shows internal
market and business outlook industry association
slide show consultants
tax memorandum enterprises association
Documents 
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Table 2: Summary of interview data used for analysis    
 
Interviews 
Type Number of hours Number of people 
interviewed 
Preliminary interviews 9 7 
   
In-depth case interviews 46.5 – 2.5 (preliminary hours) = 44 23 in total  
--- at the following levels  To say: 
--------Corporate  Tax managers ----3 
 Quality Director ----1 
 Internal auditor at product division ----1 
--------Product Division Controller ----1 
 Plant controller ----2 
 Industrial planner ----1 
 General plant manager ----2 
--------SBU Controller ----2 
--------BL General manager ----2 
 Controller ----4 
 HRM ----3 
 Logistics manager ----1 
   
Outside transfer pricing experts 25.5 16 
   
Follow-up inside MNE 8 8 
   
Follow-up outside MNE 6 16 
   
Total number of interview hours  92.5  
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Table 3: Dynamics in strategy and organisation design  
 
Strategic 
focus  
1993 – 1998 1998 - 2001 
Corporate 
level 
Recovery of profitability: simplified 
product costing and budgeting system 
Creating shareholder value: introduction 
of EVA and BSC 
Implementing new costing/budgeting 
system, introduction of strategic 
benchmarks 
1998: Implementation of EVA and BSC Product 
division level 
1996-2001: restructuring towards matrix form:  
product axis:  SBUs with different BLs 
functional axis: 1996: SBU Assembly & Testing; 1998: SBU Production;  
                          2000: restructuring of sales organisations   
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Table 4: Dynamics in transfer pricing fiscal compliance  
 
Initiative by Corporate Tax department Reaction by Product Division Semiconductors 
1993: Request to all product divisions to 
document their transfer pricing policy for 
goods  
1994: Prepared a 4-page Semiconductors transfer 
pricing document 
Contents: current transfer pricing methods in use, 
motivation, regional and national sales organisations, 
conclusion 
1995: Request to product division 
Semiconductors to elaborate on the transfer 
pricing policy for goods 
1995: Set up a Transfer Pricing workgroup  
with 9 fixed members (from financial department, 
Corporate Tax Managers, BL manager, plant manager, 
Semiconductors legal department ) 
and other managers involved regularly (corporate 
internal auditors, SBU managers, regional sales 
managers) 
1996: Publication of an enterprise-wide 
transfer pricing document. External 
consultants checked the documents and 
provided evidence of comparables.  
1996: Provided a  21-page Transfer Pricing document: 
Contents: Introduction, Description of semiconductors 
activities, Legal structure, Business organisation, Basic 
transfer pricing  policy, Transfer pricing method for the 
manufacturing organisations, Transfer pricing  method 
for the selling organisations, Functional analysis, 
Transfer pricing  to other MNE organisations, Other 
issues 
1999: Publication of a revised enterprise-
wide transfer pricing document. 
1999: Differentiated the mark-up for production 
(higher) from the mark-up for assembly and test 
activities 
 Contents: identical sections as in 1996 document.  
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Table 5: Dynamics in terms of organising controls   
 
Tax compliance  MCS Design  
Centralisation / decentralisation 
Since 1993: 
Need for a consistent and transparent transfer pricing 
policy as the best defence towards the tax authorities 
worldwide 
1993 - 1994: Implementation of simplified budgeting 
and costing system in the product division 
Semiconductors 
1996: Central design of  uniform assembly and test 
transfer prices 
1998: Central design of uniform production transfer 
prices 
Structuring of activities 
Since 1993: 
Need for clear transfer pricing procedures and an 
understandable document for tax compliance 
1994: First Semiconductors transfer pricing document  
1995: Internal tax team involved to follow up the 
implementation of the official transfer pricing policy 
1996: Second Semiconductors transfer pricing 
document, containing an extensive functional analysis  
1999: Third Semiconductors transfer pricing document 
provided, with differentiated uplifts for production 
versus assembly and testing 
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Table 6: Dynamics in terms of planning, and evaluating and rewarding controls   
 
Tax compliance  MCS Design  
Planning controls 
1993: Need for a consistent and 
transparent transfer pricing policy as 
the best defence towards the tax 
authorities worldwide 
1994: Implementation of simplified costing and budgeting 
system in the product division Semiconductors, formally 
designed to involve both a bottom-up and top-down process 
1995: Transfer prices were based on budgeted prices 
1996: The same targets were imposed for all assembly and 
test plants 
1998: The same targets were imposed for all production 
plants 
1995: Need for external benchmarks, 
i.e. comparables  
1994: Introduction of internal benchmarks 
1995: Introduction of external comparables 
Evaluating and rewarding controls 
1993: Corporate Tax department 
started to put pressure to install a 
uniform, consistently applied transfer 
pricing policy. 
1998: Introduction of BSC on a company-wide basis: 
financial and customer-related performance measures were 
determined by product division level; competence and 
process measures determined by managers involved at all 
managerial levels  
1998: Introduction of bonus system in Europe (already 
existing in US and Asia). For financial BSC targets: no bonus 
was given if these financial targets were not attained. For all 
other BSC targets: if the managers could give a reasonable 
explanation for not attaining these targets, a (part of the) 
bonus could still be given 
2000: Review of the BSC and introduction of rolling budgets 
2001: Product division management puzzled about the 
performance evaluation system of the national sales 
organisations: if more control over costs was installed, the 
current transfer pricing system could come under pressure 
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